MILNET Mirror Document
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Center For Defense Information
Reprinted on MILNET with permission. For more information on CDI, see their online site at http://www.cdi.org. Note that some minor reformatting has taken place to ensure readability on the Worldwide Web. A dual column version which appears very close to the original format is also available online at MILNET.
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The DEFENSE MONITOR
(C) 1981 CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION - WASHINGTON, D.C. I.S.S.N. #0195-6450
Vol. X, Number 5
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accidents: Danger In Our Midst
* This is a Department of Defense Document. All material in brackets by Center for Defense Information. [MILNET comments contain "- MILNET in brackets]
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENTS 1950-1980 INTRODUCTION
Attached are unclassified summaries describing the circumstances surrounding 32 accidents involving nuclaer weapons. Also attached is the Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Energy (DOE) definition of "accident" used in researching this project.
Twenty-six of these summaries were first released by the Air Force in 1977; another was prepared following the Titan II explosion in Arkansas in September 1980.
There never has been even a partial inadvertant U.S. nuclear detonation despite the very severe stresses impossed upon the weapons involved in these accidents. All "detonations" reported in the summaries involved conventional high explosives (HE) only. Only two accidents, those at Palomares and Thule, resulted in widespread dispersal of nuclear materials.
Nuclear weapons are never carried on training flights. Most of the aircraft accidents represented here occurred during logistic/ferry missions or airborne alert flights by Strategic Air Command (SAC) aircraft. Airborne alert was terminated in 1968 becaus of:
Since the location of a nuclear weapon is classified defense information, it is Department of Defense policy normally neither to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons at any specific place. In the case of an accident involving nuclear weapons, their presence may or may not be divulged at the time depending upon the possibility of public hazard or alarm. Therefore, in some of the events summarized here, the fact of the presence of nuclear weapons or materials may not have been confirmed at the time. Furthermore, due to diplomatic considerations, it is not possible to specify the location of the accidents that occurred overseas, except for Palomares and Thule.
Most of the weapon systems involved in these accidents are no longer in the active inventory. Those include the B-29, B-36, B-47, B-50, B-58, C-124, F-100, and P-5M aircraft, and the Minuteman I missile [BOMARC]. With some early models of nuclear weapons, it was standard procedure during most operations to keep a capsule of nuclear material separate from the weapon for safety purposes. While a weapon with the capsule removed did contain a quantity of natural (not enriched) uranium with an extremely low level of radioactivity, accidental detonation of the HE element would not cause a nuclear detonation or contamination. More modern designs incorporate improved redundant safety features to insure that a nuclear explosion does not occur as a result of an accident.
This list of accidents was complied by DOD/DOE researchers during December 1980-January 1981. The researchers reviewed all available records of the military services and DOE, applying current definitions to determine if an event warranted categorization as an accident.
For example, one event not covered by these narratives was included in a "Chronology of Nuclear Accident Statements," released by DOD in 1968:
The researchers found, however, that only a small retrorocket on the missile had accidentally fired. The missile and its warhead were not damaged. That event does not warrant inclusion in a list of accidents involving nuclear weapons.
Another event from the 1968 list, involving a U.S. Navy Terrier missile (January 20, 1966; NAS Mayport, Florida) was not considered to be an accident, it has been categorized as a significant incident. In that incident, a nuclear warhead separated from the missile, and fell about eight feet [aboard the USS Luce, a guided missile frigate. The event occurred on January 19]. The warhead was dented; no other damage occurred.
The events outlined in the attached narratives involved operational weapons, nuclear materials, aircraft and/or missiles under control of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy or
Any accidental or unauthorized incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon by U.S. Forces which could create the risk of nuclear war between the U.S. and the USSR.
Any nuclear weapons significant incidents other than nuclear weapons accidents or war risk detonations, actual or possible.
Any nuclear weapon incident other than significant incidents.
Any nuclear reactor or radiological accidents involving equipment used in connection with naval nuclear reactors or other naval nuclear energy devices while such equipment is under the custody of the Navy.
U.S. Department of the Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations, 15 July 1978
a predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission. The U.S. Army has never experienced an event serious enough to warrant inclusion in a list of accidents involving nuclear weapons. The U.S. Marine Corps does not have custody of nuclear weapons in peacetime and has experienced no accidents or significant incidents involving them. To the best of our knowledge, this list is complete. Reporting requirements varied among the Services, particularly in the earlier period covered by these narratives, so it is possible but not likely that an earlier accident has gone unreported here. All later events, however, have been evaluated and are included if they fall within the established definition of an accident.
No. 2, April 11, 1950/B-29/Manzano Base, New Mexico
Aircraft departed Kirtland Air Force Base [Albuquerque, N.M.] at 9:38 p.m. and crashed into a mountain on Manzano Base approximately three minutes later killing the crew [of thirteen]. Detonators were installed in the bomb on board the aircraft. The bomb case was demolished ans some high explosive (HE) material burned in the gasoline fire. Other pieces of unburned HE were scattered throughout the wreckage. Four spare detonators in their carrying case were recovered undamaged. There were no contamination or recovery problems. The recovered components of the weapon were returned to the Atomic Energy Commission. Both the weapon and the capsule of nuclear material were on board the aircraft but the capsule was not inserted for safety reasons. A nuclear detonation was not possible. No. 3, July 13, 1950/B-50/Lebanon, Ohio
The B-50 was on a training mission from Biggs Air Force Base, [El Paso,] Texas. The aircraft was flying at 7,000 feet on a clear day. Aircraft nosed down and flew into the ground killing four officers and twelve airmen. The high explosive portino of the weapon aboard detonated on impact. There was no nuclear capsule aboard the aircraft. No. 4, August 5, 1950/B-29/Fairfield-Suisun Air Force Base, [Fairfield,] California [Later renamed in honor the General officer killed on board, General Travis - MILNET].
A B-29 carrying a weapon, but no capsule, experienced two runaway propellers and landing gear retraction difficulties on takeoff from Fairfield-Suisan Air Force Base (now Travis Air Force Base). The aircraft attempted an emergency landing and crashed and burned. The fire was fought for 12-15 minutes before the weapon's high explosive material detonated. Nineteeen crew members and rescue personnel were killed in the crash and/or the resulting detonation, including General Travis. No. 5, November 10, 1950/B-50/Over Water, Outside United States
Because of an in-flight aircraft emergency, a weapon containing no capsule of nuclear material was jettisoned over water from an altitude of 10,500 feet. A high-explosive detonation was observed.
CDI: There is no record of recovery of this nuclear weapon.
No. 6, March 10, 1956/B-47/Mediterranean SeaThe aircraft was one of a flight of four scheduled for non-stop deployment from MacDill Air Force Base [Tampa, Fla.] to an overseas air base. Takeoff from MacDIll and first refueling were normal. The second refueling point was over the Mediterranean Sea. In preparation for this, the flight penetrated solid cloud formation to descend to the refueling level of 14,000 feet. Base of the clouds was 14,500 feet and visibility was poor. The aircraft, carrying two nuclear capsules in carrying cases, never made contact with the tanker. An extensive search failed to locate any traces of the missing aircraft or crew. No weapons were aboard the aircraft, only two capsules of nuclear weapons material in carrying cases. A nuclear detonation was not possible. No. 7, July 27, 1956/B-47/Overseas Base
A B-47 aircraft with no weapons aboard was on a routine training mission making a touch and go landing when the aircraft suddenly went out of control and slid off the runway, crashing inot a storage igloo containing several nuclear weapons. The bombs did not burn or detonate. There were no contamination or cleanup problems. The damaged weapons and components were returned to the Atomic Energy Commission. The weapons that were involved were in storage configuration. No capsules of nuclear materials were in the weapons or present in the building. No. 8, May 22, 1957/B-36/Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico
The aircraft was ferrying a weapon from Biggs Air Force Base, Texas, to Kirtland Air Force Base. At 11:50 a.m., Mountain Standard Time, while approaching Kirtland at an altitude of 1700 feet, the weapon dropped from the bomb bay taking the bomb bay doors with it. Weapon parachutes were deployed but apparently did not fully retard the fall because of the low altitude. The impact point was approximately 4.5 miles south of the Kirtland control tower and .3 miles west of the Sandia Base reservation. The high explosive material detonated, completely destroying the weapon and making a crater approximately 25 feet in diameter and 12 feet dep. Fragments and debris were scattered as far as on mile from the impact point. The release mechanism locking pin was being removed at the time of release. (It was standard procedure at that time that the locking pin be removed during takeoff and landing to allow for emergency jettison of the weapon if necessary.) Recovery and cleanup operations were conducted by Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Radiological survery of the area disclosed no radioactivity beyond the lip of the crater at which point the level was 0.5 millroentgens. There were no health or safety problems. Both the weapon and capsule were on board the aircraft but the capsule was not inserted for safety reasons. A nuclear detonation was not possible.
"Nuclear weapons are designed with great care to explode only when deliberately armed and fired. Nevertheless, there is always a possibility that, as a result of accidental circumstances, an explosion will take place inadvertently. Although all conceivable precautions are taken to prevent them, such accidents might occur in areas where weapons are assembled and stored, during the course of loading and transportation on the ground, or when actually in the delivery vehicle, e.g., an airplane or a missile."
The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
1962
Two weapons were jettisoned from a C-124 aircraft on July 28 off the east coast of the United States. There were three weapons and one nuclear capsule aboard the aircraft at the time. Nuclear components were not installed in the weapons. The C-124 aircraft was enroute from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware when a loss of power from number one and number two engines [of four a major problem for this aircraft when carrying extremely heavy atomic bombs of this era!- MILNET] was experienced. Maximum power was applied to the remaining engines; however, level flight could not be maintained. At this point, the decision was made to jettison cargo in the interest of safety of the aircraft and crew. The first weapon was jettisoned at approximately 2,500 feet altitude. No detonation occurred from either weapon. Both weapons are presumed to have been damaged from impact with the ocean surface. Both weapons are presumed to have submerged almost instantly. The ocean varies in depth in the area of the jettisonings. The C-124 landed at an airfield in the vicinity of Atlantic City, New Jersey, with the remaining weapon and the nuclear capsule aboard. a search for the weapons or debris had negative results. No. 10, October 11, 1957/B-47/Homestead Air Force Base, [Homestead,] Florida
The B-47 deparated from Homestead Air Force Base shortly after midnight on a deployment mission. Shortly after liftoff one of the aircraft's outrigger tires exploded [B-47 used retractablex wheel assemblies on the outside edge of the main wings to support the extremely flexible droppy wings - MILNET] The aircraft crashed in an unhabited area approxiately 3,800 fet from the end of the runway. The aircraft was carrying one weapon in ferry configuration in the bomb bay and one nculear capsule in carrying case in the crew compartment. The weapon was enveloped in flames which burned and smoldered for approximately four horus after which time it was cooled with water. Two low order high explosive detonations occurred during the burning. The nuclear capsule and its carrying case were recovered intact and only slightly damaged by heat. Approximately one-half of the weapon remained. All major components were damaged but were identifiable and accounted for.
CDI: Four crewmen were killed.
No. 11, January 31, 1958/B-47/Overseas BaseA B-47 with one weapon in strike configuration was making a simulated takeoff during an exercise alert. When the aircraft reached approximately 30 knots on the runway, the left rear wheel casting failed. The tail struck the runway and a fuel tank ruptured. The aircraft caught fire and burned for seven hours. Fireman fought the fire for the alloted ten minutes fire fighting time for high explosive contents of that weapon, then evacuated the area. The high explosive did not detonate, but there was some contamination in the immediate area of the crash. After the wreckage and the asphalt beneath it were removed and the runway washed down, no contamination was detected. One fire truck and one fireman's clothing showed slight alpha contamination until washed. Following the accident, exercise alerts were temporarily suspended and B-47 wheels were checked for defects. No. 12, February 5, 1958/B-47 Savannah River, Georgia
The B-47 was on a simulated combat mission that originated at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. While near Savannah, Georgia, the B-47 had a mid-air collision at 3:30 a.m. with an F-86 aircraft [high performance fighter interceptor of this era - MILNET]. Following the collision the B-47 attempted three times to land at Hunter Air Force Base, Georgia, with a weapon aboard. Because of the condition of the aircraft, its airspeed could not be reduced enough to insure a safe landing. Therefore, the decision was made to jettison the weapon rather than expose Hunter Air Force Base to the possibility of high explosive detonation. A nuclear detonation was not possible since the nuclear capsule was not aboard the aircraft. The weapon was jettisoned into the water several miles from the mouth of Savannah River (Georgia) in Wassaw Sound off Tybee Beach. The precise weapon impact point is unknown. The weapon was dropped from an altitude of approximately 7,200 feet at an aircraft speed of 180-190 knots. No detonation occurred. After jetison the B-47 landed safely. A three square mile area was searched using a ship with divers and underwater demolition team techniques using Galvanic drag and hand-held sonar devices. The weapon was not found. The search was terminated April 16, 1958. The weapon was considered to be irretrievably lost. No. 13, March 11, 1958/B-47/Florence, South Carolina
On March 11, 1958 at 3:53 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, a B-47E departed Hunter Air Force Base, Georgia as number three aircraft in a flight of four enroute to an overseas base. After level off at 15,000 feet, the aircraft accidentally jettisoned an unarmed nuclear weapon which impacted in a sparsely populated area 6-1/2 milse east of Florence, South Carolina. The bomb's high explosive material exploded on impact. The detonation casued property damage and several injuries on the ground. The aircraft returned to base without further incident. No capsule or nuclear materials was aboard the B-47 or installed in the weapon.
"The explosion of a nuclear device by accident--mechanical or human--could be a disaster for the United States, for its allies, and for its enemies. If one of these devices accidentally exploded, I would hope that both sides had sufficient means of verification and control to prevent the accident from triggering a nuclear exchange. But we cannot be certain that this would be the case."
Assistant Secretary of Defense
1962
A B-47 caught fire on take-off. Three crew members successfully ejected; one was killed when the aircraft crashed from an altitude of 1,500 feet. One nuclear weapon was on board when the aircraft crashed. The resultant detonation of the high explosive made a crater of 35 feet in diameter and six feet deep. Nuclear materials were recovered near the crash site. No. 15, November 26, 1958/B-47/Chennault Air Force Base [Lake Charles,] Louisiana [now closed]
A B-47 caught fire on the ground. The single nuclear weapon on board was destroyed by the fire. Contamination was limited to the immediate vicinity of the weapon residue within the aircraft wreckage. No. 16, January 18, 1959/F-100/Pacific Base
The aircraft was parked on a reveted hardstand in ground alert configuration. The external load consisted of a weapon on the left intermediate station and three fuel tanks (both inboard stations adn the right intermediate station.) When the starter button was depressed during a practice alert, an explosion and fire occurred when the external fuel tanks inadvertantly jettisoned. Fire trucks at the scene put out the fire in about seven minutes. The capsule was not in the vicinity of the aircraft and was not involved in the accident. There were no contamination or cleanup problems. No. 17, July 6, 1959/C-124/Barksdale Air Force Base [Bossier City,] Louisiana
A C-124 on a nuclear logistics movement mission crashed on take-off. The aircraft was destroyed by fire which also destroyed one weapon. No nuclear or high explosive detonation occurred--safety devices functioned as designed. Limited contamination was present over a very small area immediately below the destroyed weapon. This contamination did not hamper rescue or fire fighting operations. No. 18, September 25, 1959/P-5M/Off Whidbey Island, Washington
A U.S. Navy P-5M aircraft ditched in Puget Sound off Whidbey Island, Washington. It was carrying an unarmed nuclear antisubmarine weapon containing no nuclear material. The weapon was not recovered. No. 19, October 15, 1959/B-52/KC-135/Hardinsberg, Kentucky
The B-52 departed Columbus Air Force Base, Missississippi at 2:30 p.m. Central Standard Time, October 15, 1959. This aircraft assumed the #2 position in a flight of two. The KC-135 departed Columbus Air Force Base at 5:33 p.m. CST as the #2 tanker aircraft in a flight of two scheduled to refuel the B-52. Rendevous for refueling was accomplished in the vincinity of Hardinsburg, Kentucky at 32,000 feet. It was night, weather was clear, and there was no turblence. Shortly after the B-52 began refueling from the KC-135, the two aircraft collided. The instructor pilot and pilot of the B-52 ejected, followed by the electronic warfare officer and the radar navigator. The co-pilot, navigator, instructor navigator, and tail gunner failed to leave the B-52. All four crewmembers in the KC-135 were fatally injured. The B-52's two unarmed nuclear weapons were recovered intact. One had been partially burned but this did not result in the dispersion of any nuclear material or other contamination. No. 20, June 7, 1960/BOMARC/McGuire Air Force Base, [near Trenton,] New Jersey
A BOMARC air defense missile in ready storage condition (permitting launch in two minutes) was destroyed by explosion and fire after a high pressure helium tank exploded and ruptured the missile's fuel tanks. The warhead was also destroyed by the fire although the high explosive did not detonate. Nuclear safety devices acted as designed. Contamination was restricted to an area immediately beneath the weapon and an adjacent elongated area approximately 100 feet long, caused by drain-off of the firefighting water. No. 21, January 24, 1961/B-52/Goldsboro, North Carolina
During a B-52 airborne alert mission structural failure of the right wing resulted in two weapons separating from the aircraft during aircraft breakup at 2,000--10,000 feet altitude. One bomb parachute deployed and the weapon received little impact damage. The other bomb fell free and broke apart upon impact. No explosion occurred. Five of the eight crew members survived. A portion of one weapon, containing uranium, could not be recovered despite excavation in the waterlogged farmland to a depth of 50 feet. The Air Force subsequently purchased an easement requiring permission for anyone to dig there. There is no detectablex radiation and no hazard in the area. CDI: This report does not adequately convey the potential seriousness of the accident. The two weapons were 24 megaton nuclear bombs. Combined, they had the equivalent explosive power of 3,700 Hiroshima bombs. All of the bombs dropped on Japan and Germany in World War II totaled 2.2 megatons. The Office of Technology Assessment's study, The Effects of Nuclear War, calculated that a 25 megaton air burst on Detroit would result in 1.8 million fatalities and 1.3 million injuries. Upon recovering the intact bomb it was discovered, as Daniel Ellsberg has said, that "five of the six safety devices had failed." "Only a single switch," said nuclear physicist Ralph E. Lapp, "prevented the bomb from detonating and spreading fire and destruction over a wide area." [what CDI does not say is that at no time was this weapon physically able to have a nuclear detonation. These six safety switches were only part of the total safety mechanisms on the weapon, and the statement "only a single switch..." is hyperbole of the worst kind - MILNET] This accident occurred four days after John F. Kennedy became President. He was told, according to Newsweek, that, "there had been more than 60 accidents involving nuclear weapons,' since World War II, "including two cases in which nuclear-tipped anti-aircraft missiles were actually launched by inadvertance." As a result of the Goldsboro accident many new safety devices were placed on U.S. nuclear weapons and the Soviets were encouraged to do the same. No. 22, March 14, 1961/B-52/Yuba City, California
A B-52 [from Mather Air Force Base near Sacramento] experienced failure of the crew compartment pressurization system forcing descent to 10,000 feet altitude [below 14,000 feet is where life giving on board bottled oxygen is not needed to breath and pressure is normal enough to allow human intake of air...all aircrew, civilian or military are taught to descend to 10,000 feet upon cabin de-pressurization - MILNET]. Increased fuel consumption caused fuel exhaustion before rendevous with a tanker aircraft. The crew bailed out at 10,000 feet except for the aircraft commander who stayed with the aircraft to 4,000 feet, steering the plane sway from a populated area. The two nuclear weapons on board were torn from the aircraft on ground impact. The high explosive did not detonate. Safety devices worked as designed and there was no nuclear contamination. No. 23, November 13, 1963/Atomic Energy Commission Storage Igllo/Medina Base, [San Antonio,] Texas
An explosion involving 123,000 lbs. of high explosive
"Some day there will be an accidental explosion of a nuclear weapon, a pure accident, which has nothing whatsoever to with military or political plans, intentions, or operations. The human mind cannot construct something that is infallible. Accordingly, the laws of probability virtually guarantee such an accident--not because the United States is relaxing any of the conscientious precautions designed to prevent one, or because the Soviet Union is necessarily getting more careless with warheads, but simply because sheer numbers of weapons are increasing....Nuclear weapons will surely spread throughout the world. They may become available in international trade; even that is not to be excluded. With thousands of nuclear weapons in existence, the danger of a nuclear accident in the world is unquestionably increasing."
The Question of National Defense
Accidents of this sort probably happen more frequently than reported. In December 1980 a Department of Energy trailer carrying plutonium overturned on icy roads on Interstate 25 near Fort Collins, Colorado, on its way from Richland, Washington, to Los Alamos, New Mexico [see Nuclear Weapons Couriers on MILNET - MILNET]. Each year hundreds of nuclear convoys [approximately 50 tractor-trailer combos according to DoT - MILNET] travel millions of miles [total miles for all years up to 1996 was stated as 3.5 million miles by DoT - MILNET] on U.S. highways. Even when there is no accident, exposure over a period of years to radioactive material by certain Department of Energy couriers and privately contracted transporters and personnel may be carcinogenic. It has been estimated that nearly 120,000 persons have access to U.S. nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissionable material. A study on the hazards of low level, intrinsic radiation inherent in nuclear weapons is being conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency and will be released in 1982.
The weapons work at Mediana was phased out in 1966 and consolidated with production activities in the Pantex, Texas (near Armarillo) and Burlington, Iowa, final assembly plants.
No. 24, January 13, 1964/B-52/Cumberland, MarylandA B-52D was enroute from Westover Air Force Base, [Chicopee Falls,] Massachusetts, to its home base at Turner Air Force Base, [Albany,] Georgia. The crash occurred approximately 17 miles SW of Cumberland, Maryland. The aircraft was carrying two weapons. Both weapons were in a tactical ferry configuration (no mechanical or electrical connections had been made to the aircraft and the safing switches were in the "SAFE" position). Prior to the crash, the pilot had requested a change of altitude because of severe air turbulence at 29,500 feet. The aircraft was cleared to climb to 33,000 feet. During the climb, the aircraft encountered violent air turbulence and aircraft structural failure subsequently occurred. Of the five aircrew members, only the pilot and co-pilot survived. The gunner and navigator ejected but died of exposure to sub-zero temperatures after successfully reaching the ground. The radar navigator did not eject and died upon aircraft impact. The crash site was an isolated mountainous and wooded area. The site had 14 inches of new snow covering the aircraft wreckage which was scattered over an area of approximately 100 yards square. The weather during the recovery and clean up operation involved extreme cold and gusty winds. Both weapons remained in the aircraft until it crashed and were relatively intact in the approximate center of the wreckage area. No. 25, December 5, 1964/LGM 30B (Minuteman ICBM)/Ellsworth Air Force Base, [Rapid City,] South Dakota
The LGM30B Minuteman I missile was on strategic alert at Launch Facility (LF) L-02, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota. Two airmen were dispatched to the LF to repair the inner zone (IZ) security system. In the midst of their checkout of the IZ system, one retrorocket in the spacer below the Reentry Vehicle (RV) fired, causing the RV to fall about 75 feet to the floor of the silo. When the RV struck the bottom of the silo, the arming and fusing/altitude control subsystem containing the batteries was torn loose, thus removing all sources of power from the RV. The RV structure received considerable damage. All safety devices operated properly in that they did not sense the proper sequence of events to allow arming the warhead. There was no detonation or radioactive contamination.
CDI: The Minuteman I was a three stage intercontiental ballistic missile [ICBM - MILNET] carrying a one megaton warhead. The first missiles became operational in November 1962. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s they were gradually replaced by Minuteman IIs and IIIs. The Office of Technology Assessment study calculated that a one megaton surface burst in Detroit would cause 70 square miles of property destruction, a quarter of a million fatalities, and half a million injuries.
No. 26, December 8, 1964/B-58/Bunker Hill (now Grissom) Air Force Base, [Peru,] IndianaSAC aircraft were taxing during an exercise alert. As one B-58 reached a position directly behind the aircraft on the runway ahead of it, the aircraft ahead brought advanced power. As a result of the combination of the jet blast from the aircraft ahead, the icy runway conditions, and the power applied to the aircraft while attempting to turn onto the runway, control was lost and aircraft slid off the left hand side of the taxiway. The left main landing gear passed over a flush mounted taxiway light fixture and 10 feet further along in its travel, grazed the left edge of a concrete light base. Ten feet further, the left main landing gear struck a concrete electrical manhole box, and the aircraft caught on fire. When the aircraft came to rest, all three crew members aboard began abandoning the aircraft. The aircraft commander and defensive systems operator egressed with only minor injuries. The navigator ejected in his escape capsule, which impacted 548 feet from the aircraft. He did not survive. Portions of the five nuclear weapons on board burned; contamination was limited to the immediate area of the crash and was subsequently removed.
CDI: The B-58 [Hustler - MILNET] supersonic bomber was operational from 1960-69 and 104 were built [until the B-1B went into service, the B-58 was had been the highest performance bomber capable of carrying the five huge nuclear weapons in its bomb bay. also, the B-58 was configurable to carry a large fuel tank on its belly at the centerline, which had to be ejected in order to open the bomb bay doors. - MILNET]
No. 27, October 11, 1965/C-124/Wright-Patterson Air Force Base [near Dayton] OhioThe aircraft was being refueled in preparation for a routine logistics mission when a fire occurred at the aft end of the refueling trailer. The fuselage of the aircraft, containing only components of nuclear weapons and a dummy training unit, was destroyed by the fire. There were no casulties. The resultant radiation hazard was minimal. Minor contamination was found on the aircraft, cargo and clothing of explosive ordinance disposal and fire fighting personnel, and was removed by normal cleaning. No. 28, December 5, 1965/A-4/At Sea, Pacific
An A-4 aircraft loaded with one nuclear weapon rolled off the elevator of a U.S. aircraft carrier and fell into the sea. The pilot, aircraft, and weapon were lost. The incident occurred more than 500 miles from land.
CDI: The A-4 is [no longer in U.S. service - MILNET] a lightweight attack bomber. The weapon may have been a B-43 nuclear bomb.
No. 29, January 17, 1966/B-52/KC-135/Palomares, Spain[the second most serious nuclear weapons accident on record - MILNET]
The B-52 and the KC-135 collided during a routine high altitude aire refueling operation. Both aircraft crashed near Palomare, Spain. Four of the eleven crewmembers survived. The B-52 carried four nuclear weapons. One was recovered on the ground, and one was recovered from the sea, on April 7, after extensive search and recovery efforts. Two [the remaining two of the four total - MILNET] weapons' high explosive materials exploded on impact with the ground, releasing some radioactive materials. Approximately 1400 tons of slightly contaminated soil and vegatation were removed to the United States for storage at an approved site. Representatives of the Spanish government monitored the clean-up operation.
CDI: The DOD summary is ia typically low-key account of the most well publicized nuclear accident which resulted in what has been described as "the most expensive, intensive, harrowing and feverish underwater search for a man-made object in world history." The B-52 was returning to Seymour Johnson Air Force Base at Goldsboro, North Carolina, after flying the southern route of the SAC air alert missions (code named "Chrome Dome"). It was attempting its third refueling of the mission with a KC-135 tanker from the American base at Moron, southwestern Spain, near Sevilla. Although the official report of the cause of the accident was not released to the public, it is believed that while attempting to dock at 30,000 ft above the Spanish coast, the nozzle of the tanker's boom, which was supposed to hook up with the B-52's orifice, struck the bomber, ripping open the B-52 along its spine and causing aerodynamic stress which snapped the bomber into pieces. Flames spurted through both planes and the KC-135s 40,000 gallons of jet fuel ignited, killing its four crew members almost immediately. Four of the seven crew members of the B-52 managed to eject and parachute to safety.
As the two planes, worth $11,000,000 and weighing loaded nearly 800,000 lbs., crashed and burned, wreckage fell across an area of land and water of about 100 square miles. Of the four H-bombs (believed to be in the 20-25 megaton range) aboard, one fell to earth and remained relatively intact, two [were destroyed, - MILNET] scattered plutonium widely over the fields of Palomares when their high explosive material detonated, and one [the fourth - MILNET] fell into the ocean. For the next three months the village was turned upside down as the search, decontamination and removal operation began. Estimates for the amount of radioactive soil and vegetation removed to the nuclear dumping site at Aiken, South Carolina, range up to 1,750 tons.
"Despite the most elaborate precautions, it is conceivable that technical malfunction or human failure, a misinterpreted incident or unauthorized action, could trigger a nuclear disaster or nuclear war."
- Introduction of U.S.-Soviet Treaty
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
September 1971
The weapon that sank in the Mediterranean caused the greatest problem. Its recovery required the assembly of a naval task force, including a small armada of miniature research submarines, scuba teams, sonar experts, nuclear weapons engineers, oceanic photographers, and hundreds of sailors aboard ships of the Sixth Fleet which were called in to seal the area. It took two weeks for the midget sub "Alvin" to sight the bomb, entangled in its parachute 12 miles off Palomares on a 70 degree slope at a depth of 2,500 feet. After a series of failed attempts, the bobm was finally recovered on April 7, dented but intact, with no known radiation leakage. The Palomares search took about eighty days and required services of 3,000 Navy personnel and 33 Navy vessels, not counting ships, planes, and people used to move equipment to the site. By 1969, a U.S.Commission had settled 522 claims by Palomares residents totalling $600,000. It also gave the town of Palomares the gift of a desalting plant, which cost about $200,000 to build.
No. 30, January 21, 1968/B-52/Thule, GreenlandA B-52 from Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York, crashed and burned some seven miles southwest of the runway at Thule Air Base, Greenland, while approaching the base to land. Six of the seven crew members survived. The bomber carried four nuclear weapons, all of which were destroyed by fire. Some radioactive contamination occurred in the area of the crash, which was on the sea ice. Some 237,000 cubic feet of contaminated ice, snow and water, with crash debris, were removed to an approved storage site in the United States over the course of a four-month operation. Although an unknown amount of contamination was dispersed by the crash, environmental sampling showed normal readings in the area after the cleanup was completed. Representatives of the Danish government monitored the cleanup operation.
CDI: The B-52 was flying the Artic Circle route as part of the continuous airborne alert operation, "Chrome Dome," involving anywhere from 6 to 50 B-52s. A fire broke out in the navigator's compartment and was soon out of control, spreading smoke throughout the plnae. The pilot headed the bomber towards Thule Air Base, located about 700 miles above the Arctic Circle on the northwestern Greenland coast, to attempt an emergency landing. The seven crew members had to eject when the plane was at about 8-9,000 feet and about four miles south of the runway. Six of the crew members parachuted to safety with only slight injuries while one, the co-pilot died. After it was abandoned, the plane did a 180 degree turn and crashed onto the ice of North Star Bay, seven and one-half miles southwest of Thule, whereupon it skidded across the ice in flames and exploded. It is believed that the high explosives in the outer coverings of the four 1.1 megaton H-Bombs aboard detonated, releasing radiation from the plutonium in the bombs and causing fires which destroyed all four. Wreckage of the plane was widely scattered in an area about 300 yards on either side of the plane's path, much of it in "cigarette box-sized" pieces.
A team of 70 Air Force and civilian specialists were flown in to monitor radiation and search for debris and the bombs, soon followed by the Navy's special team which at worked at Palomares. The bombs' parts were discovered and ten days later on the snow within 1,000 feet of the path of the plane.
A massive collection and removal effort began. The contaminated ice and crash debris were removed to the United States, the bomb debris to the AEX Pantex plant at Amarillo, Texas, where the bombs had been manufactured. A few days after the crash, Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the removal of nuclear weapons on airborne alert. The alerts were later curtailed and then suspended altogether.
The government of Denmark, which owns Greenland and prohibits nuclear weapons on or over their territory, issued a strong protest. There were large demonstrations throughout Denmark against the U.S. and its base at Thule. Costs of the crash, clean-up and compensation ran into the millions of dollars.
No. 31, Spring 1968/At Sea, AtlanticDetails Remain Classified
CDI:The accident probably refers to the nuclear powered attack submarine USS Scorpion. The Scorpion was last heard from on May 21, 1968. It was returning to Norfolk, Va. after a three month training exercise with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. It sank 400-500 miles southwest of the Azores. Initial suspicion that the Soviets were somehow involved was allayed when the research ship Mizar photographed the wreckage lying at 10,000 feet on the sea floor. A Navy seven-man court of inquiry met for eleven weeks and heard 90 witnesses. The found "No evidence of any kind to suggest foul play or sabotage," and that the "certain cause of the loss of the scorpion cannot be ascertained from evidence now available." Ninety-nine men were lost. The nuclear weapons aboard may have been either SUBROC [Submarine launched ROCkets propelled depth charge - MILNET] or ASTOR, or both. SUBROC, first deployed in 1965, is an anti-submnarine missile and nuclear depth charge. Attack submarines normally carry 4-6 SUBROCs, which have a range of 25-30 miles and high explosive power. ASTOR is the nuclear version of the MK45 torpedo which went into service around 1960 and has low explosive power.
No. 32, September 19, 1980/Titan II ICMB/Damascus, ArkansasDuring routine maintenance in a Titan II silo, an Air Force repairman dropped a heavy wrench socket, which rolled off a work platform and fell toward the bottom of the silo. The socket bounced and struck the missile, causing a leak from a pressurized fuel tank [holed the side of the missile AND penetrated the tank...Wow! - MILNET]. The missile complex and the surrounding area were evacuated and a team of specialists was called in from Little Rock Air Force Base, the missile's main support base. About 8 1/2 hours after initial puncture, fuel vapors within the silo ignited and exploded. The explosion fatally injured one member of the team. Twenty-one other USAF personnel were injured. The missile's reentry vehicle, which contained a nuclear warhead, was recovered intact. There was no radioactive contamination.
CDI: The explosion of volatile fuel blew off the 740 ton silo door of reinforced concrete and steel and catapulted the warhead 600 feet. The 54 liquid-fueled Titan II missiles have been operational since 1963 [no liquid fuel silo missiles remain in operation today - MILNET]. It is estimated that Titan II ICBMs carry a 9 megaton warhead. The Office of Technology Assessment study estimated that a 9 megaton airburst on Leningrad would result in 2.4 million fatalities and 1.1 million injuries. With age, the seals on the missiles are corroding, increasing the number of leaks. The worst missile accident occured in Searcy, Arkansas on August 9, 1965, when a fire in a Titan II silo killed 53. The Air Force has disclosed that between 1975 and 1979 there have been 125 accidents at Titan sites in Arkansas, Arizona and Kansas. From March 1979 to September 1980 there were ten other leaks and accidents at Arkansas Titan sites. On August 24, 1978 at a Titan sit in Rock, Kansas, two airmen were killed and thirty others injured when they were exposed to deadly oxidizer gas. The silo at Damascus, Arkansas will be filled in with gravel while that at Rock, Kansas is being refurbished and is planned to be operational in September 1982.
CONCLUSIONS
Back to MILNET Nuclear Accidents Report
1 The Defense Monitor, Vol. X, Number 8, Copyright, 1981, The Center For Defense Information, 122 Maryland Avenue NE, Washington, D.C., 20002, ISSN #0195-6450, reprinted on MILNET with permission.
MILNET Nuclear Pages
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August, 1997
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