Perhaps in the age of globalization where the domestic agriculture policies of the United States can totally alter the stock market of Thailand the answer to the question of how should governments respond to the eroding sovereignty isn’t to give more power back to the people but give more power to the elites. This is, at least in part, the argument of Fareed Zakaria in his addition to the globalization literature happily titled The Future of Freedom. In his examination of political systems throughout the world and in the United States he argues for a few main issues, some widely agreed upon and others quite controversial.

First, as his subtitle – Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad – seems to hint at, liberty and democracy are not synonymous and in fact a democracy can exist which doesn’t provide liberty for its citizens. This argument is quite widely accepted and only goes to show that not all undemocratic states are threats to the new found idol of human rights. For instance, Britain for the longest time (namely the 19th century) existed without democracy but in fact promoted individual liberty to a good extent. Moreover, the democracies of ancient Greece and early America consisted of a great deal of people who possessed no liberty whatsoever, although they were more likely to be called slaves or property than people (at least in America).

Zakaria’s second main argument is that the public and policymakers often overlook liberty-promoting institutions – in democracies or any other type of state – instead only caring for, and in fact overly caring for, institutions that promote democracy. As has been argued by many people over the years, and is echoed in Zakaria, elections are not an end result of anything but rather only a possible tool of many that can achieved a liberal state that promotes human rights and economic prosperity. However, it is become quite clear recently that Zakaria is right in saying policymakers put too much emphasis on institutions of democracy as the end-all-be-all of a state, as President Bush now hails the amazing achievements of Iraq hosting elections, despite rampant intolerance, violence and no signs of true liberty. This, moreover, is a large point of contention for Zakaria at a personal level, as he writes his contempt for his birthplace of India and its democracy – the largest democracy in the world – that receives so much praise yet, in his eyes, is corrupt, fanatic and intolerant, or in one word – illiberal.

So while these first two arguments may be debatable they are nonetheless relatively uncontroversial and have plenty of other scholars backing them. However, it is his third argument that draws a lot of criticism and rightfully so, for Zakaria argues that democracy is now spreading, and has spread, so far that it is eroding liberty, in America and elsewhere. Moreover, then, after elucidating this argument with examples such as post-Communist Russia where the poor are getting poorer, the corrupt are getting richer and the freedoms are falling away, Zakaria concludes that what the world needs is not more democracy, but less, that the US should stop these crazy popular referendums and that developing nations should stop overthrowing their dictators – like the Philippines with their People Power movements likes to do – and let those who can make the shrewd decisions make those decisions. In order to understand this argument as it fits in with other globalization literature it is important to examine the underlying theories Zakaria relies on to make his points.

First, democracy – according to Zakaria and others – just isn’t going to work if the nation has a gross domestic product (GDP) below $5,000. A large middle class must exist for democracy to succeed, a middle class that has the leisure to go vote and learn about the issues but doesn’t have the money to control all of the representatives like an upper class. Therefore, Zakaria’s recommendation for third world nations that are moving towards democracy right now without that GDP is to stop, sit back, let their tyrants rule the economy and just reap the benefits. While there are many problems with this perspective, there are a few in particular that stand out. First, it relies on a poor use of examples, such as Suharto era Indonesia, South Korea as ruled by a military junta, and the dictatorship of Thailand. The problem doesn’t lie, necessarily, in the examples because they were all – to a greater or lesser extent – authoritarian, rather the problem lies in what can be attributed to these authoritarian powers. Zakaria cites the horrible economic losses in Indonesia once Suharto was overthrown and concludes that it was completely the fault of the new democracy that the economy fell. The problem is, that while Suharto did liberalize the economy and there was economic growth during his reign, there was also a high level of corruption and only a short-sided plan that was bound to collapse in the long run, with a democracy or not. So while Zakaria can argue for the economic shrewdness of authoritarian leaders all day he can never justify why it is uniquely and solely the fault of any post-authoritarian democracy that problems arose.

Moreover, if examining Zakaria’s argument from an ethical perspective, such as that of Peter Singer or His Holiness the Dalai Lama, it seems quite immoral to allow human rights abuses and a destruction of people’s opinion, even if for no other reason than they don’t get to vote, in the name of economic prosperity. Of course, then, the response from Zakaria is that while there may be problems in the short term, the long term will find a flourishing democracy. The economic shrewdness of an authoritarian will lead to a great pluralistic democracy because economic prosperity necessarily leads to a desire for more say in government as well as an authoritarian regimes’ desire to give that say – at least that is how the argument for modernization theory goes, and this is certainly what Zakaria is arguing.

While modernization theory is certainly the theory of choice for guiding United States foreign policy, it is not the most ethical view to take. For example, while Peter Singer would argue for the humanitarian intervention of the nation of Burma – a nation repressed by a military junta for roughly 40 years that has arrested democratic leaders and constantly worked against any promotion of democracy – on the grounds that the people need the help of the world and it is a very selfish view to take that perhaps if we just trade with the junta they will give money to the people and then respond thirty years down the road when those people ask for a little bit of democracy. Similarly, the Dalai Lama – who probably has one of the best positions to speak from for his nation of Tibet is in a similar situation – would argue for an ethic that recognizes the contribution the Burmese people could make to the world and that destruction of life anywhere is a destruction of life everywhere, for all life originates and operates dependently. Therefore, it is not enough to let an entire population be destroyed because sooner or later it may proceed to a perfect democracy. It is a shame what America is doing in regards to Tibet and China, opening up trade in the hopes that a middle class will lead the way. But this is exactly what Zakaria is arguing for, engage Burma economically and let those military tyrants get rich because it just may lead to the growth of a middle class and surely those dastardly generals are only ruling with an iron fist now because they care about liberty, right? Of course not, and to believe that is ludicrous. This third argument and general conclusion for the world that Zakaria makes is just absolutely unethical and completely disregards the notion that states are made up of people. A state isn’t an independent entity that is uniform throughout the world and fits one mold depending upon the organization, the state is the people and if the people in power are dead set on maintaining power then they for damned sure aren’t going to give it up simply because a new middle class asked for it. And what of rebellion? Why would a newly formed middle class that is profiting so well from the rule of the tyrants – if of course their rule ever produced a middle class – ever rebel against the very government that made them rich? How, historically, have authoritarian regimes kept the people in check? By ensuring those that may have the time to think about rebelling are kept fat and happy.

So why Zakaria is probably just out of his mind when he argues for the preservation of authoritarian regimes in third world nations, he may be on to something when he specifically mentions the third world nations in the middle east. Although they are not really attempting to move towards democracy, the US and others are thinking it would be a good idea – at least publicly. And according to Zakaria this is very dangerous. The examples like Jordan and Saudi Arabia offer a great example of “liberal authoritarians†ruling over very illiberal people. While Saudi Arabia is in fact very limiting to women, the leaders of the country are nonetheless more liberal than much of the populace that is in the trance of the Wahabists. Jordan is an even better example, because the King is quite liberal and offers great freedoms to the people that would quite possibly not exist if popular elections were held, which would certainly put many religious fanatics in power. In these instances the only real question is whether democracy alone is good for the people, at least of the nation, and therefore even if it may not be in the interest of the US specifically it should nonetheless promote elections. For Zakaria this is obviously a no, and it would seem that Singer and the Dalai Lama would tend to agree, seeing as neither is blinded enough to see democracy as a great end in itself.

So, then, perhaps the conclusion shouldn’t be that authoritarians shrewdly handling the economy are always better than democracy ruled by the “great unwashedâ€Â. Rather, it is a question, very simply, of whether or not the people are roughly as liberal as the authoritarian. Sure, democracy may not be the best option in the middle east because of the fanaticism that could arise, but it may not be a bad deal in a third world nation like Indonesia even if it does have some economic problems, because liberty-wise it doesn’t have fanatics running the country by any means.

Thus, while Zakaria certainly offers an interesting and challenging perspective to the current crisis of a loss of liberty in this age of globalization, he seems to fall short of any great ethic of globalization and instead only insists on an illogical, unhistorical and immoral approach to international relations in general and nation-building specifically.