Influenced by Thomas Hobbes, among many others, Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza offers an interesting twist on the social contract tradition while also containing much of what made Hobbes, Locke and even Rousseau so popular among political theorists. While he offers a similar path of rational growth, from the state of nature to the nature of the state by compact, he does so in a fashion wholly different from any of the social contract theorists. Instead of arguing for a juridical state, like Hobbes, and arguing for any form of legal philosophy, like Rousseau, Spinoza takes an approach which strives for maxims for actions based on empirical knowledge. (Geismann 48) By examining Spinoza’s notion of the state of nature, the extent of power for the sovereign and the ends of a commonwealth both clear similarities and key differences can be found that make Spinoza’s theory very unique while maintaining it in the tradition so popular during his time.

The first examination necessary of Spinoza’s political philosophy comes in his conception of the state of nature. Without offering a systematic and wholly conceptual world like Hobbes or Locke, Spinoza bases his state of nature strictly on his metaphysics. Under this framework, a few key aspects should be examined. First, Spinoza’s conception of the rights – which extends to the commonwealth but certainly has its beginnings in the state of nature – and specifically how it compares to that of Thomas Hobbes’ conception. Secondly, the justification for why the natural state is a “war of all against all†needs to be explored while leading up to the third important notion, which is whether or not a peaceful community necessitates a commonwealth or could exist without the sovereign.

According to Thomas Hobbes, the right of Nature involves a person having the liberty to use her own power as she will for the preservation of her own nature and life. This involves doing anything which, in her own judgment and reason, is conceived as being the best action. (Hobbes 84) Spinoza’s right of Nature is nearly identical, arguing that the right of nature is everything a person does in accordance with the laws of her nature, meaning so long as it is done not by outside coercion then it is right. (Geismann 43) According to Spinoza’s conception of the state of nature, “each thing in nature has as much right from nature as it has power to exist and act.†(Tractatus Politicus II-3) Thus humans are no different from other creatures in nature, and this idea of right as derived from power is also applicable to God. More importantly here, however, is the fact that this conception of “right†is pretty much worthless. If anything a person does is right so long as it fits within their nature and power then, of course, no action can ever be condemned. And while Hobbes would also contend that there is no sense of justice in the state of nature because everyone has the right to act towards their own self-preservation however they see fit, Hobbes at least provides for a right and wrong action once the commonwealth is established, which is more than Spinoza attempts, as will be explored later.

But from this conception of right can be drawn a few clear arguments. First, that like Hobbes all people in the state of nature have a right to all things. Second, that for Spinoza it is not only right for a person to do all things she can to preserve herself but it is also natural, because it exudes from her identity. Finally, under this conception of right trust is impossible because it could be in anyone’s nature to treat covenants or agreements as pure fluff and violate them at anytime.

The second exploration of the state of nature – that of the conceptions of the constant state of war – begins with Spinoza extending on the conception of Hobbes. The Leviathan argues that within the war of all against all, people act totally in their own interest but do so out of reason. They rationally aim at their self-preservation. (Hobbes 84) Spinoza extends this by claiming that the constant state of war is spurred on not only by people rationally striving for their own self-interest but also, and mainly, because people are striving for their own self-interest based on desire. (Geismann 44) Moreover, whereas Hobbes finds it rational to work completely for one’s self preservation and that humans are, in fact, rational beings, Spinoza argues that people, in nature, naturally disagree because they naturally follow their passions rather than their reason. (Geismann 44) This certainly leads to a clear point of contention between Hobbes and Spinoza since the Hobbesian conception is based on the notion that people are rationally working for their own self-interest, it means that the natural person is acting under the guise of reason. However, if Spinoza were to hold this view, which he doesn’t, it would mean that the state of nature would be peaceful, because all people acting according to reason would all agree. (Geismann 48)

This of course means that for Spinoza, logically, the state of nature could be peaceful and therefore the state is not necessary. If all people were “saints†then there would be no need for laws. Of course this isn’t the case, and that is why Spinoza can empirically move towards a civil society. Moreover, as will be explored more later, Spinoza believes that the way a commonwealth achieves peace is by allowing all its individuals to achieve peace. As such, if the state of nature satisfied the conditions that allowed all individuals to achieve peace, or more accurately all individuals were able to achieve peace without a specially suited environment, then the state of nature becomes a state of peace and the need for a state disappears. (Geismann 49)

So both agreements and disagreements can be found between Hobbes and Spinoza in their conceptions of the state of nature. These comparisons can continue, as well, in their conceptions of the commonwealth and specifically in the extent of power they give over to the sovereign. First by examining the desirable form of government, second by exploring the powers and rights individuals maintain within the commonwealth, and finally by exploring the nature of the covenant it will be concluded that Spinoza certainly took in the ideas of Thomas Hobbes but came up with a very different approach to the state.

Benedict de Spinoza believes there are three main types of government – rule by one (as in a monarch or tyranny), rule by a few (as in an aristocracy or an oligarchy) and rule by the masses (as in a democracy). For Spinoza all three forms have flaws, none are perfect, but the guiding principle behind figuring out which one is the best is to determine which one is least liable to make irrational decisions. Whereas past philosophers have contended that the masses are dumb and easily fooled and will make bad decisions, Spinoza’s preference for democracy comes from a theory of likelihoods, specifically that is unlikely that the majority of a people will agree on an irrational design. (Szalai 32) Moreover, whereas Hobbes would prefer to put all the power in the hands of a single monarch, Spinoza would argue that a monarchy is the most likely form of government to become tyrannical. (Nadler) Moreover, continuing in his empiricist vein, Spinoza argues that a democracy is simply the best system because all others risk discontent, overthrow and dissolution more so than democracy. If the people all have a say, and if pluralism is allowed to flourish, then empirically discontent (at least violent discontent) is decreased and the civil society becomes more stable.

Furthermore, in the vein of John Locke, Spinoza prefers democracy because it is the best arbiter of liberty. For him, the principle of majority rule coupled with a liberal ethos best protects minority rights and the rights of the individual. (Freeman 159)

Even deeper, however, democracy is intriguing to Spinoza because it reflects the structure of Substance found in his metaphysics. Specifically, it acts as a microcosm of the universe – the heterogeneity of human types in a commonwealth parallels the heterogeneity in the amounts of both modes and natural right/power found in the order of things. (Freeman 158) Therefore, similar to the appeal of Plato’s Republic by its parallel to the individual, Spinoza finds a method to consistently argue for one basic metaphysics. This also allows him to overcome, at least in part, the awkward discrepancy between his hard determinism and ideal of a liberal, pluralistic democracy. Even if God, which is in everything for Spinoza, has determined the path of the entire universe at infinitum that does not necessitate the building of a civil society along the same lines (i.e. monarch) to form a microcosm, because the microcosm can come simply from the pluralism.

So a democracy becomes appealing to Spinoza in both a metaphysical and pragmatic sense, but beyond this difference lies another. Like Hobbes, Spinoza argues that people must necessarily come together in an agreement which would provide better security for all those in the society. However, Spinoza argues further that it is within the state where a person is more able to exercise reason and enjoy all the rights which naturally belong to them as individuals (Geismann 44) whereas Hobbes would contend that all rights, except that of self-preservation, must be granted to the sovereign in order for society to function. Therefore, whereby Hobbes’ absolute sovereign sets him apart from all other social contract theorists, Spinoza falls more in line with John Locke who argues for society not just providing a better ability to live but actually enhancing liberty. Moreover, this means that the extent of authority for the sovereign is not the great relinquishing of rights that is found in the Leviathan but rather is more like the fiduciary relationship found in Locke’s Second Treatise.

Moreover, the nature of the covenant formed in order to create the commonwealth becomes an interesting point of contention between Hobbes and Spinoza. Hobbes argues that once a commonwealth has been established and the rights of the individuals have been given to the sovereign then the deal cannot be broken. In fact, the third law of nature for Hobbes is that every person perform their covenants made, because if they didn’t then the covenants are simply empty words and the state of war of all against all remains. (Hobbes 86) For Spinoza, however, the universal contract formed is just that, empty words, a non-binding statement of intent with “respect to the future use of one’s own ability to act.†(Geismann 45) In fact, at any given time an individual may rightfully (under the context of the right of nature) break the contract if it is perceived to not be of higher utility to the person than no contract. Thus, while Hobbes would agree that the commonwealth is created to establish a better life for people than the state of nature, he still holds that the rule of the sovereign is always just and cannot be broken except unjustly. (Hobbes 94) On the contrary, Spinoza puts it best in one of his letters when he says “the difference between Hobbes and me… consists in this that I ever preserve the natural [R]ight intact so that the Supreme Power in a state has no more right over a subject than is proportionate to the power by which it is superior to the subject.†(Epistulae 50) This, thereby, reduces the absolutism of Hobbes. But it does not do it strictly because of the natural Right remains intact in the commonwealth because the state certainly has more power and is superior to the subject in every regard. Rather, the absolutism is restricted because if the state were to act on its “right†in any regard it saw fit, including the restriction of the freedoms of religion or speech or obstructing their goal of self-preservation then this could very easily lead to a decrease or even a destruction of the power and the right, via revolution or whatever. And because Spinoza argues that a “commonwealth… does wrong when it does, or allows to be done, things that can be the cause of its own downfall†(Tractatus Politicus IV-4), namely the nonobservance of natural laws, then the state would not act in a way that would lead a person to want out of the contract. Therefore, Spinoza’s restriction upon the absolutism of the state is equivalent to that of Hobbes, namely that it would be self-defeating for the state to exercise all powers it could exercise (and being absolute that means any power) because it would very likely lead to the downfall of the state. (Geismann 46) This is the same reason Hobbes presupposed a benevolent dictator and argues that the sovereign’s decrees can be wrong – because wrong comes from a moral position – but not unjust – since justice is a purely civil construct.

The final mode of Spinoza’s political theory that needs to be flushed out is to what extent the commonwealth exists. In the social contract tradition, there is always a specific end to which the government exists. For Hobbes, it is the better preservation of the life of individuals. For Locke, increased security – which he defines as the freedom to express one’s rights (of life, liberty, possessions and health) without the infringement of others. And for John Rawls, who seems to have quite a few parallels to Spinoza, it is “justice as fairnessâ€Â. (Rawls 11) Along the same vein as both Rawls and Locke, Spinoza contends that “in fact, the true aim of government is liberty.†(Tractatus theologico-politicus 259) This is because the State provides a necessary condition for the free development of philosophy, which is a necessary condition for people to perfect their specific nature. (Geismann 46-47)

Moreover, Spinoza views the end of the state in the classical liberal vein, but not the same one as Locke. For Locke, freedom (which liberalism rests upon) means freedom from the constraints of the state, basically a negative sense of freedom. (Freeman 160) In the language of Hobbes Lockean liberalism argues that “the liberties of subjects depend on the silence of the law.†(Hobbes 102) Spinoza’s liberalism is different though, as its focus is toward freeing the human from “ignorance and miseryâ€Â. (Freeman 160) In the words of Spinoza himself, “the ultimate aim of government is not to rule, or restrain by fear, nor to exact obedience, but contrariwise, to free every [hu]man from fear, that s/he may live in all possible security†(Tractatus theologico-politicus XX 258-259).

Furthermore, this freedom from fear and ability to live in all possible security necessitates two forms of freedom, metaphysical and political. For Spinoza, freedom in the metaphysical sense promotes an active an explicit recognition of the consequences of the eternal order. (Freeman 161) However, this journey towards an understanding of the eternal order necessitates a great use of reason and therefore Spinoza argues (viz. Freeman) that “the individual whose reason is the strongest and who is guided by reason is the freest.†(Freeman 162) This metaphysical sense, however, flows from Spinoza’s determinism and is often harshly (and rightfully) rejected. Instead, many people accept the political freedom approach, which is more of a Lockean and negative freedoms approach. Here, the freedom comes from a person’s ability to exercise their reason and rational needs without impediment and furthermore to not be coerced into actions. (Freeman 166)

Therefore, the end of the commonwealth for Spinoza is not a well ordered society necessarily, or the “orderly walls of a prison cell†as Locke would put, but rather much closer to the security that John Locke calls for, whereby all people are better able to access their rational potential, come to grasp with the eternal order of the universe, and get closer to God. All of this is done, of course, through a liberal democratic order which promotes peace, plurality and liberty.

According to German professor Georg Geismann, “Spinoza, at his best, is not only a forerunner of the Enlightenment but also an excellent representative of it.†(Geismann 53) Spinoza’s political philosophy, while influenced by Thomas Hobbes, breaks from a tradition – both theoretically in philosophers all the way back to Plato and practically in nearly all states up to Spinoza’s time and long after – of absolutism that lets individuals divest so much power to a single individual or small group of individuals. Spinoza’s demand for liberty falls contemporary with that of John Locke’s and certainly influenced the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls. By examining his conception of the state of nature, the extent of the sovereign’s power, and the end goals of a commonwealth, all the above conclusions become clear.

Bibliography

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