NEFA Foundation: Al-Fajr Center Announces Shuttering of Three Top Jihad Web Forums

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated an Arabic-language statement from the Al-Fajr Media Center—the official online logistical network responsible for disseminating messages from various Al-Qaida military factions—announcing the sudden closure of three of the top Internet discussion forums currently used by Al-Qaida: Al-Ekhlaas, Al-Firdaws, and Al-Boraq. According to the Al-Fajr Center, the chat forums were shuttered “for technical reasons” and not—as reported in “the apostate media”—because “the offices of these websites had fallen into the hands of the enemy. Indeed, since when have jihadi websites had permanent offices?” The statement also warned that the three Internet forums will likely remain offline for some time, and that former users should be careful to avoid fraudulent efforts by “untrustworthy sources” to prematurely resurrect them: “If the source of the link is not an official announcement from the [Al-Fajr Media] Center, then it has no credibility."

A translation of the Al-Fajr Media Center statement can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Bush Administration Removes North Korea From "State Sponsors" List (updated)

By Andrew Cochran

The Bush Administration announced today that North Korea has agreed to all demands for inspection of its nuclear facilities, enabling the U.S. to remove North Korea from the list of "state sponsors of terrorism." The removal is only "provisional," in that North Korea would return to the list if it fails to comply with the inspections.

On June 27, Michael Kraft discussed this issue in detail, the steps required under law to remove a "state sponsor," and the continuing concerns over the removal as expressed by key Members of Congress. To quote from that post:

"...Congress enacted related legislation requiring that it be notified 45 days in advance before a rescission of a terrorist list designation could take effect. Its purpose was to allow time for the lawmakers to try to block the proposed move if they disagreed. These procedures were laid out under the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 (ATAEAA, Public Law 101-222). The law was a Congressional reaction to the Reagan Administration’s removal of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from the terrorism list in 1982 without informing Congress, even informally, in advance. To review the procedures:

Under the ATAEAA law, a compromise worked out with the State Department, the President may propose to remove a country from the terrorism list under one of two procedures: Under the first, he must submit a report to selected legislators that states:

(i) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government concerned;
(ii) that the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and
(iii) the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

This procedure was adopted at the State Department’s request in case there was a situation in which the designated country’s leadership and policies suddenly changed and the U.S. wanted to quickly provide economic or other assistance.

Alternately, the President may lift a terrorist list designation by sending a report to the Congressional leadership 45 days before the proposed rescission would take effect that states:

(i) the government concerned has not provided support for international terrorism during the preceding 6-month period;

(ii) and the country has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

This second procedure is being used in North Korea’s case."

Michael also discussed North Korea's history of support for terrorism:

"While the nuclear issues are the focus of the Congressional concerns, there are still some lingering old terrorism issues although North Korea has not been involve (sic) in terrorist attacks in recent years. Secretary of State George Shultz placed North Korea on the terrorism after the bombing of Korean Airlines Flight 858 in 1987 by North Korean agents. North Korean operatives were also behind a 1983 attempt to kill South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan, who was scheduled to visit a memorial in Rangoon, Burma (now Myanmar. The timed bombs went off before his arrival, killing 17 South Korean dignitaries instead...

North Korea also had supported terrorist groups operating in the Middle East and Sri Lanka. For example a January, 2008 Congressional Research Service Brief, page 17, describes press reports that North Korea has provided arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Both groups are designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S.

The reports fit a historic pattern. North Korea provided training and other assistance to a variety of terrorist groups in the 1960’s and 70’s including the Palestine Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine when it conducted major aircraft hijackings and other attacks and to the Japanese Red Army. These two groups staged a joint attack in 1972 that killed 24 persons including 16 American citizens from Puerto Rico when their plane landed in Israeli for a Christian pilgrimage."

Today's decision is already drawing criticism from the ranking Republican on the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and might also draw criticism from leading Democrats on that committee who expressed their skepticism this year of North Korea's intentions. UPDATE: But Congress is powerless to block the removal, because the Administration sent the 45-day notice on June 26, according to Rep. Ros-Lehtinen's office. Congress can and, I assume, will conduct oversight hearings on North Korea's compliance with the inspection regime.

Two days ago, I posted about the release by the Treasury Department of the annual report of the blocked assets in the U.S. of "state sponsors" and designated persons. As of the end of 2007, a total of $32 million in funds in the U.S. and foreign branches of U.S. banks had been frozen, and North Korea owned no other real or tangible personal property in the U.S. I don't know how the "provisional" status of the removal affects the unblocking of these funds and will update this post for more information on that issue. None of those funds are needed to settle claims against North Korea, as discussed in the 2007 report of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission at the Justice Department, because Congress appropriated special funds to satisfy those claims.

OPEC War against America’s Economic Independence?

By Walid Phares

According to economic analysis the severe financial crisis ravaging the US and hitting the international community on all continents has its economic roots in two major realms: One was the overbearing political pressure put on Wall Street to release loans into unprepared sectors of society and two, was the miscalculation -some say the drunkenness- of Wall Street in accepting these immense risks. But according to Political Economy assessment, there may have been a third player in the crisis: OPEC, or more precisely, radical circles within Oil Producing regimes in the Peninsula. The thesis argue that combined Salafist-Wahabi and Muslim Brotherhood circles in the Gulf -with consent from the Iranian side on this particular issue, used the escalating pricing of Oil over the past year to push the financial crisis in the US over the cliff. The “high point” in this analysis is the timing between the skyrocketing of the prices at the pumps and the widening of the real estate crisis. In short the “Oil-push” put the market out of balance hitting back at Wall Street. Basically, there was certainly a crisis in mismanagement domestically (with its two above mentioned roots), but the possible OPEC economic “offensive” crumbled the defenses of US economy in few months.

The link between this analysis and our counter terrorism interests is dual. One, if the forthcoming investigation will demonstrate that there was a war room manipulated by the “radicals” within OPEC striking at US and Western economies, we would be witnessing the rise of the concept of “economic terrorism.” Two, and as the forthcoming investigation is progressing, a re-reading of al Qaeda and other Jihadi literature, speeches and statements about the Silah al Naft (Weapon of Oil) and more particularly the calls by Ayman Zawahiri on “selling US dollars and buying Gold, ahead of American economic collapse” seems to be necessary. Zawahiri’s statements most likely aren’t coordinated with the OPEC “hard core” push but his knowledge of the “push” is more than likely because of his ties to the Wahabi-Salafi circles inside the Kingdom. Moreover, such a finding would shed light on the analysis of commentary on the web and on Satellite media about "the necessity for Americans to feel the pain of economic pressures, to put political pressures on their Government to change course in the region."

I am posting here two pieces on the subject.

Read More »

Negotiating Under Fire

By Matthew Levitt

On October 3, 2008, Ghaith al-Omari and Dennis Ross joined me at a Policy Forum luncheon at The Washington Institute to honor the launch of my new book, Negotiating Under Fire. Mr. al-Omari, a former advisor to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, is currently the advocacy director at the American Task Force on Palestine. Ambassador Ross is an independent consultant to The Washington Institute and has previously served in senior foreign policy positions in the Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton administrations. The following is drawn from the rapporteur's summary of our remarks. An audio recording of the event is available here. A special publisher's discount on the purchase price of the book is available here.

A peace process is not necessarily a peaceful process. Negotiations do not occur in a vacuum, and external events -- violent attacks, in particular -- have a direct impact on the process. Terrorist attacks upset the negotiation process by freezing whatever positive momentum the parties have established, and then injecting a countermomentum that undermines the ability and willingness of both parties to continue.

Consider the following three cases highlighted in Negotiating Under Fire: the February 1994 Hebron massacre by Baruch Goldstein, the November 1994 kidnapping and murder of Israeli soldier and dual U.S. citizen Nachshon Wachsman, and the February/March 1996 string of terrorist attacks in Israel.

Read More »

House Cleaning in Damascus?

By Olivier Guitta

I just wrote an article for the Middle East Times, delving into the Syrian imbroglio. Lots of "incidents" have been happening in this usually very quiet country.
To read the full article, click here.
Here is an excerpt:

While it is tough to know for sure what is going on in Assad's country, a certain pattern is emerging. And all roads lead to the International Tribunal that is meant to try the murderers of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. For the time being the various U.N. reports on the investigation are pointing to one direction where the culprits are presumed to be: Damascus.

What Assad would hate more than anything is that his regime would stand accused and be convicted of being behind the assassination of Hariri. The International Tribunal has become an obsession for the Syrian president. According to the Beirut daily Al-Anwar who cites Lebanese and international sources who obtained copies of the forthcoming report from the international commission, Syrian security services heavyweights are reportedly implicated in Hariri's assassination.

This has put the regime in Damascus in a near panic state. A number of analysts believe that Assad will go to great lengths to prevent the tribunal from proceeding. Now a more clear explanation of events which unfolded in Syria over the last year begins to emerge.

It all started with the assassination in February in Damascus of Hezbollah's Imad Mughnieh. While no formal accusation against the Syrian security services can be made, there is no way that in a country so tightly controlled there was not at least complicity from some in the regime. Interestingly, Mughnieh was suspected of having a hand in Hariri's murder and it could have been convenient for Damascus to get rid of him to avoid linkage to the regime.

Treasury Reports on Assets in U.S. of Terrorist Countries and Designees

By Andrew Cochran

The U.S. Treasury has released its latest annual report on the assets in the U.S. of state sponsors of terror and the other international terrorism program designees (Acrobat file). This report, mandated under law since 1991, is the sixteenth released by the Treasury and covers calendar year 2007.

As of December 31, 2007, the amount of assets of international terrorist organizations and individuals which were blocked totaled over $20.7 million. Of that, over $11.3 million constituted assets of Al Qaeda, and that level was an increase of almost 46 percent over the level blocked as of the end of 2006. The report states, "The increase in blocked terrorist organization assets in 2007 is due to new or additional blockings, interest paid on blocked funds, and increased share price on certain blocked securities."

As of December 31, 2007, the amount of blocked funds in the U.S. relating to the state sponsors of terrorism on that date (Cuba, Sudan, Syria, North Korea, and Iran) totaled over $315 million, including a small amount of funds in foreign branches of U.S.-based banks. Additionally, there were $87 million in funds of Iran and Syria which were not blocked, and also unvalued real and tangible personal property located in the U.S. The report includes more details on each of those three categories.

A Slow Recognition of the Criminal-Terrorist Connection

By Douglas Farah

Slowly, it seems, the criminal-terrorist nexus is coming into a sharper focus for policy makers. The head of DHS intelligence analysis Charlie Allen, recently acknowledged the "threats in this hemisphere are real. We cannot ignore them."

This may not seem like much, but until now, there has been only passing comments by U.S. Southern Command commanders and the DEA on the linkages between drug trafficking organizations and Islamist radicals. In this case, the threat is primarily from Iran and the Shiite Hezbollah organization rather than the Sunni-al Qaeda linked groups.

DEA Chief of Operations Mike Braun, at the same conference, aptly noted that drug traffickers and terrorist organizations often have much in common: ""They use the same money launderers, the same document forgers," he said. "You are naturally going to bump up against terrorist organizations."

Much of the discussion of these matters takes place in the context of these linkages being hypothetical, something to watch out for down the road.

Allen said the possibility of cooperation between terrorists and drug trafficking organizations was a "low probability" and would be "unprecedented," but that it was feasible.

I have a somewhat different take on this because, while each piece of the puzzle presents a fragmentary picture, all the pieces together show this would be, I think, a far higher probability.

The alliances among drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations have already taken place in Colombia (The FARC and AUC). The FARC has demonstrated an ability to reach out to other terrorist groups-even those who have little in common with the FARC's Marxist ideology-for technology sharing, information sharing and weapons (see paper I did for the NEFA Foundation for details). My full blog is here.

NEFA Foundation: Somali Islamists Release Video of FBI Most Wanted Terror Suspect

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained an Arabic-language video recording released by the Shebaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia featuring a statement from Kenyan national Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan (a.k.a. “Abu Yousef”), who is currently wanted by the FBI “in connection with the 2002 attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, against a hotel and an airliner.” In his video address, Nabhan expressed his admiration and respect for Al-Qaida leader Usama Bin Laden, calling upon Muslims around the world: “Here are the training camps in Somalia and elsewhere… that have opened their doors so that you join them… Do you not see your brothers from the people of Al-Shams and your brothers in Egypt and your brothers in Iraq? …So likewise I say, Oh people of Kenya and Tanzania, and Nigeria and Uganda and Chad! Will you not take your share of the jihad? …And we are waiting for reinforcements from Sudan and Yemen of wisdom and faith. Rise up from your seats, in the houses of your mothers, and join the caravan of the protectors of al-Tawheed… and be among those who raise the black banner in Somalia the first time after the invasion of the Ethiopian scum.”

An English transcript of al-Nabhan's remarks can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Voices of the Awakening: VIP Visits to Awakening Leadership in Anbar

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

Today FDD's Center for Terrorism Research brings you the sixth installment of our Voices of the Awakening series, authored by Sterling Jensen. The series is designed to provide Westerners a better understanding of ongoing developments in the Iraqi Awakening movement. This regular feature includes critical translations of Awakening news and documents, Jensen's observations and analysis, and occasional interviews with the movement's leaders.

This week the Iraqi Awakening held three VIP meetings with important visitors to Anbar: the Iraqi Caretaker of the Hajj Mohammed Taqi al-Mullah, former Iraqi Minister of Defense Sadoon al-Dulaymi, and Undersecretary of State John Negroponte and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker. An excerpt from our update:

NEFA Foundation: Transcript of Latest Adam Gadahn Video Message

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and transcribed a copy of the latest English-language video message from American Al-Qaida spokesman Adam Gadahn (a.k.a. “Abu Azzam al-Amriki”) released on October 3, titled “The Believer Isn’t Stung from the Same Hole Twice.” Breaking his silence after a nearly ten-month unexplained absence from Al-Qaida propaganda videos, Gadahn sharply criticized the Pakistani government and military under the leadership of, respectively, President Asif Ali Zardari and General Ashfaq Kayani. In addition to his analysis of the increasingly unstable situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Gadahn also commented on “the looming meltdown threatening the crusaders economic system”—whose “primary cause”, according to Gadahn, is Americans “turning their backs on Allah’s revealed laws, which forbid interest-bearing transactions, exploitation, greed, and injustice in all its forms, and demand the worship of Allah alone to the exclusion of all false gods, including money and power.”

The transcript can be accessed on the NEFA Foundation website.

Qatar Exaggerates IMF Assessment of Anti-Terrorist Financing Regime

By Andrew Cochran

A headline in the October 7 issue of "The Peninsula," a leading daily newspaper in Qatar, boasts, "Country free of terror financing: IMF report," with the lead sentence, "A report just issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has given Qatar a clean bill of health stating there is no terrorism financing and minimal money laundering taking place in the country, if at all."

Which would be great if the report really says that... but it doesn't. Here are a few selections from the actual report, available in full here. You be the judge:

"Terrorist financing is criminalized, albeit in a limited way, under Article 4 of the Law No. (3) of 2004 on Combating Terrorism (CT Law). It may apply with respect to all “terrorist crimes” which cover all the offenses listed in the standard, bar the unlawful seizure of an aircraft carried out with no intention to terrorize, cause harm, death or material damage and with no political motive... The offense, therefore, does not extend to the collection of material or financial assistance for and their provision to terrorist individuals or for a terrorist act." (Page 9.)

"(A)n interdepartmental committee has been established to coordinate Qatar’s efforts in the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 and the international conventions on the fight against terrorism, but its mandate does not cover UNSCR 1373; no authority has been granted the powers to designate terrorists; and there is no legal basis for freezing under the relevant UNSCR... It also appeared that, on one occasion, the authorities offered safe harbor to a person designated under UNSCR 1267. No actions were taken with respect to this person’s funds and other assets." (Page 10.)

"The preventive measures for financial institutions in the domestic sector fall short of addressing a vast majority of the customer due diligence elements of the international standard... The current obligations do not prohibit the opening of anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names. There are no direct requirements to determine whether a person is acting on behalf of the customer nor to identify and verify the beneficial owner of the account. The requirements for ensuring that customer documentation, information, or data are kept up-to-date are inadequate. Requirements for addressing enhanced due diligence for higher-risk categories are incomplete. There are no measures in place addressing politically exposed persons and cross-border correspondent relationships. There are no provisions covering the risk associated with new or developing technologies." (Page 11.)

"Overall, the terrorist financing offense meets most of the requirements set out in the ICSFT. However, several shortcomings remain: the coverage of terrorist acts is not sufficiently broad to be fully in line with the standard (for example, unlawful seizure of an aircraft is not considered a terrorist act in the absence of an intention to cause harm, death, terror or damage); this also limits the notion of terrorist groups or organizations; and the law does not cover the collection and provision of funds when there is no link to a terrorist group or organization. These shortcomings unduly limit the application of the terrorist financing offense." (Page 46.)

And the most troubling section in the report is about that aforementioned release of a U.N.-designated terrorist by the government (also on page 46):

Read More »

Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Threatened

By Michael Jacobson

The Washington Institute published a piece by Richard Barrett, the head of the al Qaeda/Taliban monitoring team for the UN, on how a recent ruling by the European Court of Justice could put not only the EU's but the UN's targeted sanctions regime at risk as well.

Here is an excerpt from the piece:

In early September, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) -- the highest court in the European Union -- ruled that the EU's application of UN sanctions against Yasin Qadi and the al-Barakaat International Foundation infringed their basic rights, and declared the action illegal under EU law. Although the judgment applies only to these two parties, the ruling has far-reaching consequences, for not only the EU but also the entire UN system of targeted sanctions.

ECJ Ruling

The EU imposed sanctions on Qadi, a Saudi businessman, and al-Barakaat, a money remitter in Sweden, when they appeared on the UN Security Council's al-Qaeda/Taliban list in October 2001. Although countries must implement Security Council sanctions, they can choose how to do so. EU member states adopted a regulation that automatically applied sanctions to any individual or entity mentioned by the UN. The sanctions include an assets freeze and severe travel restrictions.

The ECJ overturned a lower court ruling that suggested EU member states had little choice but to handle UN designations in this pro forma manner. The ECJ decided that despite their obligations under the UN Charter, EU members could not adopt a regulation that infringed rights integral to EU law. What most concerned the court was that the listed parties were not informed of their wrongdoing and had no opportunity to put their case before an independent review body.

The court neither questioned the right of the Security Council to impose sanctions, nor asked if such action was appropriate. Furthermore, the court gave the EU three months to address the identified problems before the judgment took effect. But whatever the EU does, the court has issued a major challenge to the use of sanctions as an international counterterrorism tool.

Although Qadi and al-Barakaat remain on the UN list, the twenty-seven EU member states will need to find a new way to implement the sanctions against them -- in a manner that satisfies the court. If they fail to do so, the UN sanctions regime may collapse.

To read the rest of the piece, click here

NEFA Foundation: Taliban Deny Reports of Peace Talks, Urge Fighters to Avoid Innocent Civilians

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained four new statements from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Taliban). In these new communiqués, the Taliban have denied widespread rumors of Saudi-sponsored peace talks with the Afghan government and have mocked news that U.S. troops withdrawing from Iraq may soon be sent to Afghanistan. The communiqués also include an official message from Taliban commander Mullah Mohammed Omar, in which he strongly warned Taliban fighters, “be very careful when you face the general population and your innocent countrymen. Don’t go ahead with an attack which has the possibility of harming the general population… Every act [must be avoided] which is not in harmony with the teachings of Islam, which is not customary in our Islamic civilization, or which reflects poorly upon the Islamic nation. Covert enemy operations carried out in your name—such as the blasts in the mosques where there are gatherings of innocent people, highway robbery, the chopping of noses and ears in the name of what is forbidden in Islam and what is considered permissible or non permissible, and the burning of Islamic books—must be strongly countered. Whoever is responsible for acts such as this for whatever reasons must restrain his group, and must not defame our mujahideen.”

The translated statements can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.

Afghanistan at the Tipping Point

By Douglas Farah

Seems like things in Afghanistan, at least in the world of perceptions, is going south as fast as Dow Jones. While circumstances on the ground have not changed radically in recent months, the Taliban have scored significant success simply by starting the current debate on whether the war in Afghanistan is winnable at all.

The opening salvo was fired in a leaked French diplomatic cable, which quoted the British ambassador in Kabul as saying the war couldn't be won.

According to the New York Times version:

"The current situation is bad, the security situation is getting worse, so is corruption, and the government has lost all trust," the British envoy, Sherard Cowper-Coles, was quoted as saying by the author of the cable, François Fitou, the French deputy ambassador to Kabul.

"The presence of the coalition, in particular its military presence, is part of the problem, not part of its solution," Cowper-Coles was quoted as saying. "Foreign forces are the lifeline of a regime that would rapidly collapse without them. As such, they slow down and complicate a possible emergence from the crisis."

Then, in one of the first stories on what all of Kabul knows, the NYT took on the issue of the possible involvement of President Karzai's brother, Ahmed Wali, to the booming heroin trade. This, of course, only serves to reinforce the ambassador's fears about the growing corruption and the complete loss of faith in the Karzai. My full blog is here.

The CIA and the Looming Threats for the Next Administration

By Douglas Farah

CIA director Mike Hayden gave an an interesting interview to Fox News identifying the the greatest security challenges to the next administration.

One of the identified threats (after the increasingly unstable but nuclear-armed North Korea) is what Hayden dubbed the "Axis of Oil," that dangerous mix of petro-fueled dollars giving Russia, Iran and Venezuela the economic means to become increasingly reckless militarily.

This is correct, and, I believe, a healthy recognition that there are serious threats outside the Iraq and radical Sunni Islamist threat. The alliance of a radical Shiite Islamist state, a radical populist government and a nation correctly described as one that is reversing democratic gains and ruled by officially sanctioned organized crime, indeed poses a threat.

What gives that Axis its power is the money we pay for foreign oil. What binds them together is this money and their avowed and public desire to go after not just the United States, but Western democracies in other places.

None of them would be able to retain their oppressive state structures and fuel instability abroad (particularly aimed at Latin America) if they didn't have the billions of petro-dollars to do it.

Unfortunately, a full transcript of Hayden's remarks has not been posted, so all we have is a snippet of Hayden noting that oil prices, which are still hovering around $100 per barrel, have emboldened these oil-rich nations. "Oil, at its current price ... gives the Russian state a degree of influence and power that it would have not otherwise had," he said. full blog is here.

HLF Trial Update: "It is time for you to pledge death"

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

DALLAS - From donations urging violence to advertisements and videos lauding one of the fathers of global jihad, evidence in the Hamas-support trial against former officials at the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) Thursday took a decidedly bloody tone.

The five defendants are accused of illegally funneling $12 million to Hamas through a series of charities, or zakat committees in the West Bank and Gaza. FBI agent Lara Burns has been on the witness stand all week, presenting evidence establishing the group's stated and passionate support for Hamas.

A mistrial was declared last October after jurors could not reach unanimous verdicts on most counts. Defendant Mohamed El-Mezain was acquitted on all counts against him with the exception of a conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.

This time, added care seems to be taken to identify all the players and define their connections to the case. In addition, some of the exhibits were not entered into evidence last year.

Defense attorneys argue the men merely sought to alleviate suffering by needy Palestinians living under occupation. The images displayed Thursday rarely invoked those needy people, but focused instead on the need to attack.

Several exhibits showing HLF's invocation Abdullah Azzam, an iconic Palestinian jihadist, are among the new evidence presented by the government. Azzam moved to Pakistan after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan to set up the Office of Services of the Holy Warriors (Mujahideen) and is considered a mentor to Osama bin Laden.

The Azzam exhibits were admitted over the objection of defense attorneys. Under the judge's order, jurors were not told of Azzam's role with bin Laden and the global jihad, but did hear references to Azzam's work on behalf of Afghanistan's mujahideen. In a video from a 1988 rally in California, the year HLF was founded as the Occupied Land Fund, Azzam is shown urging Palestinians to fight to the death:

For the entire story, please visit the IPT's website.

Transcript of Event: "The Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda"

By Andrew Cochran

On September 23, the Counterterrorism Foundation and New America Foundation held a live panel discussion on Capitol Hill with Peter Bergen, CTB Contributing Experts Evan Kohlmann and Paul Cruickshank, and guest commentator Maajid Nawaz to discuss "The Jihadists' Revolt Against Al Qaeda: Why Some of Al Qaeda’s Old Allies Have Turned Against It." You can view New America's video of that panel, and you can download a transcript, thanks to Assistant Newslink Editor Brett Wallace. Here are excerpts from the panel:

Peter Bergen: "There are two central fronts in the war on terror, Iraq and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. What happened with Al Qaeda in Iraq, it was an assisted suicide, we helped their suicide and so did the Sunni awakening. They had five problems. First they have terrible leadership. Al Masri who runs AQI is not Zarqawi, Zawahiri or Osama Bin Laden, he is a bad leader. Second is organization. Third is ideological problems, they can’t make compromises. They also have made a lot of enemies such as the 1920’s Brigade. Many of the recruits that have come to Iraq are gone because they commit suicide. The fact that we have seen female suicide attacks is a sign of weakness, not strength.

We know what these groups are against but what are they for? There is no al Qaeda minister of employment, Al Qaeda school, or Al Qaeda social welfare organization. There is not a category of government they have said they are not against, Russia, China, the West, Israel, Shiites and so on. Because of this problem they can’t turn themselves into political movements."

Even Kohlmann: "Arguably over any other issue, the predominant topic of discussion, controversy—and often schism—within the Salafi-Jihadi discourse has revolved around the justifications for deliberately killing other Sunni Muslims, including both innocent civilians and competing mujahideen fighters.

Nowhere else has that debate become more evident and problematic for Salafi-Jihadi leaders than in Iraq, where the insurgency has recently undergone a series of fundamental shifts. First, a wide array of prominent Sunni insurgent factions—including the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Iraqi Hamas, and Asaeb al-Iraq al-Jihadiya (to name just a few)—have become embroiled in bitter public feuds with Al-Qaida’s “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI) over the latter’s aggressive insistence that all Sunni insurgent groups join together under the banner of the ISI. The combined impact of this has undeniably had a debilitating impact on the long-term political viability of Al-Qaida and the ISI."

Read More »

Let the Dissidents Challenge the Jihadists

By Walid Phares

Prague, September 16, 2008

At the invitation of the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI), a think tank for international relations in the Czech Republic, I delivered a lecture on “Jihadist Strategies against Europe: Background, Projections and Options.” The event was co-sponsored by the Brussels-based European Foundation for Democracy, and the forum was attended by PSSI officers, diplomats and NGO members. It is to note that under the forthcoming Czech Presidency, the European Union may be able to take perhaps more daring steps in recognizing the importance of the dissident segments of the Greater Middle East in the process of opposing totalitarian ideologies. In this lecture, part of my second summer European tour, I called on policy makers to focus seriously on a strategic support to dissidents and democracy forces inthe Arab and Muslim world instead of relying exclusively on the so-called hopeless engagement with Jihadist movements. For, as I tried to make the case, findings tells us that in every balanced opportunity when counter Jihadist Muslims engage the Jihadists in a battle of ideas, the counter Jihadists win. And everytime the Jihadists have no challengers from within the Arab and Muslim political culture to contend with, they naturally win.

Following are main excerpts of the lecture

Read More »

Central threat to democracies

“The main finding of the last 19 years since the Soviet collapse is that Jihadi-led terrorism has become a central threat to democracies worldwide. The debate among Jihadi Salafists since the Khartoum conferences in the early 1990s wasn’t between those who advocated violent Jihad as a concept and those who rejected it, as many experts in the West continue erroneously to affirm. The gist of that Jihadi debate was between two schools, as to which enemy to target and how.

Combat-Jihad (al Jihad al Qitali) is a tool, a weapon, not a sui generis doctrine by itself. As I advanced in my first post-9/11 book, Future Jihad, the realist school - the classical Wahhabis and the Muslim Brotherhood - advocated a reserved attitude towards engaging the West militarily before being able to achieve strategic parity with the West. Unfortunately, a number of analyses in the West confused this strategic approach with an alleged commitment to non-violent means. Hence, we’ve had a very poor understanding of Jihadi penetration for more than one decade. Today we see the emergence of a similar understanding within the Western counterterrorism community, which argues that the classical Jihadists are philosophically non-violent, thus they can be partnered with liberal democracies against the philosophically violent Jihadis such as al Qaeda.

Such a fundamental mistake in analysis and understanding can affect national security doctrines in the West and lead them into more serious and erroneous assessments in the future: for the debate among Jihadis is not about the use of violence or not. It is about when to use it, against whom and under which conditions. If that level of analysis is missing in the West, then another decade may well be lost in unsuccessful and futile attempts to find the “good Jihadists” and enlist them against the “bad Jihadists.”

Jihadis split over strategies, not violence

The split within the Jihadist community is not about the philosophy of violence because Jihad is not only and always sheer military action. There are Jihadi goals to attain, and Jihadi “qital” (combat) is only one means to achieve these goals. The Salafists (Wahhabis or Muslim Brotherhood) can decide not to resort to Qital as long as they are making progress in changing the balance of power to their advantage. But as the balance is changing, they will move to the next stage and use all means at their disposal, including Jihadi Qital.

The analytical mistake committed by some in the CT community is to single out a “moment” in Jihadi strategy and think it is “the” Jihadi strategy. Hence we are witnessing the proliferation of academics’ and experts’ calls to “engage” with the non-violent Jihadis as if the latter were a category in itself. In fact, this is a truncated reading of the whole process of Jihadism. Worse, it is also a maneuver by the Jihadists in their war of ideas to ignite trends within the realm of their enemies (liberal democracies) which would actually slow down the process of containment. In short, what some call “engagement” is in fact a successful move on behalf of the long term Jihadist to obstruct the West and other democracies from moving forward in their own campaign.

Penetration of Europe

From that perspective and, in view of the comprehensive monitoring of the Jihadi movement as a whole (both realists and combat Salafists), Jihadi terrorism has become a central threat to democracies at large. But that threat is even more evident and menacing with regard to Europe, i.e., the countries who are members of the European Union. The networks, both ideological and militant, have had several decades of penetration on the continent. The most affected areas are naturally the former colonial countries such as France and Great Britain, but also Spain, Holland and Italy. Germany, Scandinavia and the Benelux also absorbed a Salafi presence towards the end of the Cold War. In the big picture, Western Europe has been the recipient of significant influence and networks of Islamists from several regions of the world, particularly from the Maghreb, sub-Indian continent, and the Levant.

Central Europe and now Eastern Europe are witnessing a progression in the penetration process. But in view of the nature of Communist control for decades, the Jihadists do not yet have strongholds in cities such as Prague, Warsaw, Bratislava, Budapest and beyond. From scanning the internet, however, one can see the steady expansion of Salafism, and to some extent Khomeinist influence, but mostly migrating from Western Europe. Eventually the networks will be extended from West to East, following the expansion of the European Union itself. But let’s note that an East-West Jihadi migration is also emanating from the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Wahhabi-funded groups from Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, Chechnya and other spots are now landing in central Europe.

Another aspect of Jihadi penetration in Europe is the financial network expanding across the continent in terms of the “high finances” of Wahhabi-supported interests as well as the “low finances” of al Qaeda-type factions, both using European banking systems. The Iranian-Hezbollah financial web is also present and is detectable in Germany and Scandinavia.

Expertise’s failures

Current European expertise in counterterrorism is spending serious time and heavy funding on an attempt to understand the rise of this web of Jihadism, which is coined as the “radicalization factor.” Since the Madrid attacks in 2004, the European expert investigations have centered on the socio-economic and “root causes” of terrorism. But alternative findings, also emerging from European research, are increasingly demonstrating that the “non-Jihadi” root causes aren’t providing strategic answers. Rather, the expert advice provided to national governments and Europeans since 9/11 has failed to predict the rapid rise of the networks. Even more perturbing is that the advising process continues to push towards the “non-Jihadi” theories, even as they have collapsed critically.

For example, the classical school in counterterrorism alleges that the Jihadists do not have one overarching ideology across the continent, but separate and distinct doctrines related to local claims and demands. This claim has been shattered by the mountain of evidence that the grand doctrine -al Aqida al Jihadiya- is omnipresent from London’s enclaves to Marseilles’ suburbs and, more importantly, goes unchallenged on the internet.

Another example is the failure to understand the central core of the ideology, whose long range goals are not satisfied by political or socio-economic negotiations. The so-called disenfranchisement argument has also been shattered by the Jihadists themselves. One, their agenda rejects it; two, their social strata disprove it; and three, the direct causality between disenfranchisement and terrorism is simply not valid. Nevertheless, many advisors on Islamism continue to push a legless body of arguments, depriving decision-makers and the public from real solutions.

Ignoring who best to engage

On the other hand, the much-needed tactic of engaging counter-Jihadi Muslims and civil society groups in the Greater Middle East has been almost ignored by chanceries and their counterterrorism experts. Ironically, instead of focusing on engaging the dissidents, pro-democracy human rights NGOs and activists, the “advice” extended to European Governments and now to the United States as well, is to engage the Islamists, and even the Jihadists.

This tactic is the result of a systemic failure of understanding not only the Jihadist strategies and realities, but also the political sociology inside the Arab and Muslim world and the immigrant communities in the West and in Europe. Government policy makers were almost convinced by their senior advisers, themselves relying on academic and professional expertise that the road to de-radicalization goes through an engagement with the radicals, or those who are a little bit less radical. Hence the move - and the spending - to integrate the Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabis and Khomeinists in a bilateral dialogue with law enforcement and higher political levels for a few years now.

Obviously, the issue is not about having or not having a dialogue with these Islamist factions. It is not about “talking.” It is really about hoping that these bilateral discussions will effectively lead to de-radicalization. Undoubtedly, these engagements aren’t leading to reversing the radicalization processes, and they never will. Law enforcement and intelligence reports are clear in proving that none of this thinking has led to a reverse of Jihadization, either in Europe or in the United States.

Counter Jihadists win

In contrast, findings show that the activities by counter-Jihadist Muslim groups and similar cadres are the leading factors to help resist the advance of radical mobilization. The equations I have tested for over twenty years are verifiable: every time Jihadists and counter-Jihadists engage in a battle of ideas, counter-Jihadists win. Every time Jihadists are alone on the scene, obviously, they win.

It is now imperative that a renewed debate about radicalization in Europe, particularly in light of an EU Czech Presidency for half a year, restructures the engagement process to include the democracy segments within Middle Eastern and Muslim communities on the continent. Czech and central European experience in dissidence-dynamics and counter totalitarian processes is a needed component in the wider European effort to contain the Salafist and Khomeinist ideological expansion.

I have suggested to the forthcoming Czech Presidency of the European Union to initiate a strategy on democracy support as one of the new policies needed to win the battle of de-radicalization. Engagement must remain a solid principle, but with whom to engage strategically is the real question. My thesis is that those who deserve systematic and relentless backing are those who in their communities are willing to fight for the shared values of democracy and humanism. All attempts to ignore them have led to strengthening the very forces which are spreading Jihadism. Europeans and Americans have a real choice ahead of them, they must not fail again.

********************
Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy. He is the author of The war of Ideas: Jihadism against Democracy.

Below: A View of the 2007 Conference on Security and Democracy Conference in Prague which was attended by dozens of dissidents and intellectuals including from the Middle East: Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, etc. World leaders and personalities including President G Bush, Former Czech President Vaclav Havel, the Estonian President, Former Prime Minister Aznar, Chess player Gary Kasparov, former Soviet dissident Nathan Charansky and others, also addressed the Conference. I was one of the speakers.

« Close It

Al-Qaida's Foreign Fighters Shift Focus from Iraq to Pakistan and Afghanistan

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated Arabic-language biographies of foreign fighters—particularly those from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—which appear to document a shift in focus away from the jihad in Iraq and towards the growing conflict in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The biographies include the story of “Abu Ubaidah al-Najdi”, a 25-year old Saudi medical student who spent six months fighting in northern Iraq before leaving and “heading for Afghanistan”—and the video-recorded "martyrdom" will of "Abu Ghareeb al-Makki" (a.k.a. Kamaal al-Hadhli"), the Saudi Al-Qaida suicide bomber responsible for the June 2008 suicide bombing attack on the Danish embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. One of the other men profiled in the documents, Saudi national Sari Bin Hamad al-Sari (a.k.a. Ikrama al-Najdi)—who died in a failed Taliban assault on the Khost regional airport in Afghanistan—was reputed to have been a close friend and associate of Abu Ghareeb al-Makki. The biographies now available on the NEFA website include:

- "Death of Kuwaiti Faisal al-Dosari in Afghanistan"
- "Supervisor of Al-Firdaws Forum Joins Jihad in Afghanistan"
- "Six Saudi Heroes Killed in Afghanistan"
- "Martyrdom of Saudi Bin Hamad al-Sari in Afghanistan"

NEFA Foundation: TerrorWatch #8 and Report on the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE)

By Evan Kohlmann

The NEFA Foundation has released the latest edition of its TerrorWatch online video broadcast, which examines the growing problem of Al-Qaida safe havens and terrorist training camps flourishing along the Afghan-Pakistani border, despite the continued efforts of both the U.S. and Pakistani governments. In May 2006, a jihadi media agency in Pakistan known as “Ummah Studios” released a new video production titled “Na Pak Fouj”, documenting clashes with the Pakistani army in Northern Waziristan. The video included lengthy, detailed footage of a terrorist training camp situated somewhere in North Waziristan. As masked fighters pass in front of the camera, a nasheed song plays for viewers, imploring, “Look at the people of Allah, They came out to sacrifice their lives… They came out to shed their blood… No worry for home, no worry for land, no worry for lives they have. They are wise people who live in fear of Allah… Those who fight against the infidels are the mujahideen. Their dreams have come true.” Later, an unidentified narrator explains in Urdu: “In front of your eyes, these selected Muslim youths are preparing for jihad. Allah said, ‘Prepare to the greatest extent possible against the infidels.’ The Prophet said, ‘The power is in the shooting’—the power is in the shooting, the power is in the shooting… Today, [our enemies] are insulting the Quran. Today, they are insulting our Prophet Mohammed, and they kill Muslims wherever they want… So, according to the orders of Allah, it is our duty to prepare ourselves against the infidels and our responsibility… May Allah increase the passion for our religion among the Muslim youth, and may he grant us the strength to prepare ourselves to defend his religion.” To underline the purpose of the training offered at the camp, one of the masked recruits is shown sitting amongst his comrades and singing by himself in Urdu: “O’ infidels of the East and West, we have plans for you. We all must die, life is too short. You (Muslims) must act now, we are being oppressed. O’ soldiers of Islam, come here for jihad. O’ soldiers of Islam, come here for jihad.”

The NEFA Foundation has also released a new report by NEFA Senior Analyst Steve Merley titled "The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe." The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE) claims to be an independent organization representing the interests of Muslims in Europe. In reality, the FIOE is an umbrella group that comprises the global Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. Strong links connect FIOE's leadership central institutions and member organizations to the Brotherhood, as well as to Saudi Arabia. Funding for the FIOE is derived largely from Gulf sources, including some of the ruling families of the United Arab Emirates. The FIOE has strong ties to Hamas and Hamas fund-raising organizations, and some FIOE member organizations show evidence of links with Al-Qaida. The FIOE recently opened a headquarters office in Brussels and has had some success in positioning itself as a “dialog partner” for the EU and other important institutions.

The FARC's Shrinking World

By Douglas Farah

The concerted effort by the United States and most of the European Union, along with a few countries in Latin America, are gradually cutting off the operational areas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Yesterday's OFAC designation of eight members of the FARC's international delegation is another step in that direction. The FARC is a designated terrorist organization by the U.S. and the EU.

These International Commission members represent the FARC in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Mexico, and Canada.

As I wrote in this paper for the NEFA Foundation, the FARC's international structure has been one of the most underestimated elements of support for the terrorist organization.

Until recently the conventional wisdom was that the FARC, historically a rural-based insurgency with little regard for international opinion, had not successfully developed an international support network. The computer documents taken from the camp of Raúl Reyes, the senior FARC commander killed in Ecuador March 1, show a far different reality.

Not only is there a structure that was being nurtured and financed by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, able to reach out to weapons traffickers in Australia and Belarus, but the FARC has successfully set up front groups across Latin America and has established a significant presence in Europe. My full blog is here.

New Australian Report Adds to Concerns Over Stored Value Instruments

By Andrew Cochran

Yesterday, the Australian Institute of Criminology, a research and knowledge center on crime and justice, released a report, "Money laundering risks of prepaid stored value cards," which identifies "the misuse of prepaid stored value cards to keep the proceeds of crime and move them across borders without alerting law enforcement and financial intelligence units." The report adds to the growing body of concern among governmental officials worldwide over the use by criminals and terrorists of stored value instruments (SVIs), of which "hard cards" are but a subset. Almost three years ago, the first "U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment" described SVIs as "an emerging cash alternative for both legitimate consumers and money launderers alike." Jonathan Winer wrote in January 2007 of the first BSA enforcement action against a financial institution for failing to notice a pattern of money laundering using phone cards. This year, the 2008 edition of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, released by the State Department, included a new section on the threat of mobile payments. Numerous officials across the U.S. government, including the Pentagon's counterinsurgency and special operations units, are devoting increased time and attention to understanding the technologies involved and to developing recognition and risk mitigation strategies. Several high-level briefings have been held this year with experts from financial institutions and information technology firms, with the results and "lessons learned" communicated back through the commands and into the field, including the provision of new technology to infantry to read hard cards captured from terrorists.

The technologies available for storing value are expanding far ahead of international regulators' abilities. They include smart cards and specialized chips in cell phones, but the value need not be stored in a physical medium; instead, the card or chip could access a secure account on the internet (a "cloud account"). Current U.S. banking regulations govern only those stored value instruments provided by financial institutions and already subject to BSA/Patriot Act regulation, while SVIs issued during the course of business . But numerous non-financial institutions are also offering stored value cards as a means of paying for goods and services. Stephen Spoonamore, an expert on the technology side of the issue, tracks criminal enforcement cases in which SVIs have been captured during an arrest and provided several examples. In one case this year, suspects arrested in a raid in Brooklyn had purchased $250-300,000 in cards to personally carry money home to friends and relatives and avoid the cash reporting requirement at the border. In 2007, drug-related raids in the Las Vegas area resulted in the seizure of over 18,400 cards with a total value of approximately $6.5 million. Many of the cards were issued by retailers, which are not subject to BSA/Patriot Act regulation because they're not "financial institutions."

The market for stored value instruments is huge; the Australian report estimates gift card volume alone at almost $88 billion globally this year. I've already written on the need to update the BSA and Title III of the Patriot Act in new legislation, and this is one area which was almost unknown to the Congress and regulators in 2001. Spoonamore suggests several "tech fixes" which could reduce the risk of improper use without further legislation. As the Australian report points out, the "Violent Crime Control Act of 2007," introduced in Congress in 2007, included a provision mandating new regulations over SVIs, but no Congress did nothing about the bill. The next Administration and Congress should examine this issue in detail and consider mandating a new cost-effective and risk-based regulatory structure over all SVIs.

HLF Trial Update: Hamas Deputy Chief Settled U.S. Funding Dispute

By The Investigative Project on Terrorism (IPT)

DALLAS - A turf war between competing U.S.-based Palestinian charities in 1994 was settled by Mousa Abu Marzook, a Hamas leader who serves as its deputy political director.

In testimony Tuesday, jurors in the Hamas-support trial of five former officials at the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) heard FBI recordings showing Marzook sided with the foundation over a Mississippi-based educational fund. HLF, prosecutors say, then became the designated fundraising arm for Hamas in the United States.

The first attempt to settle the dispute between the Texas-based HLF and the Al Aqsa Education Fund first was handled by the Palestine Committee, a group created by the Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S. to help Hamas. It included HLF, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) and a think tank called the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR). Marzook had personal and financial ties with all three entities.

But Abdelhaleem Ashqar felt that HLF wasn't sending enough money to help the cause and arranged for Sheik Jamil Hamami, then a Hamas leader, to come to the U.S. in 1993 for fundraisers. HLF balked. Ashqar had an organization called the Al Aqsa Education Fund that was organizing Hamami's visit.

Defendant Shukri Abu Baker, HLF's former executive director, argued that letting Ashqar go unchecked in fundraising would set a precedent that could cripple HLF: